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Abstract
Security is a major concern in computer networking which faces increasing threats as the com-
mercial Internet and related economies continue to grow. Virtualization technologies enabling
scalable Cloud services pose further challenges to the security of computer infrastructures, de-
manding novel mechanisms combining the best-of-breed to counter certain types of attacks. Our
work aims to explore advances in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) in the context of Software
Defined Networking (SDN) architectures. While CTI represents a recent approach to combat
threats based on reliable sources, by sharing information and knowledge about computer crimi-
nal activities, SDN is a recent trend in architecting computer networks based on modularization
and programmability principles. In this dissertation, we propose IntelliFlow, an intelligent de-
tection system for SDN that follows a proactive approach using OpenFlow to deploy counter-
measures to the threats learned through a distributed intelligent plane. We show through a proof
of concept implementation that the proposed system is capable of delivering a number of ben-
efits in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, altogether contributing to the security of modern
computer network designs.
Palavras-chaves: Computer Networks; Software Defined Networking; Cyber Threat Intelli-
gence; Intrusion Detection System; OpenFlow.
Resumo
Segurança tem sido uma das principais preocupações enfrentadas pela computação em rede
principalmente, com o aumento das ameaças à medida que a Internet comercial e economias
afins crescem rapidamente. Tecnologias de virtualização que permitem serviços em nuvem em
escala colocam novos desafios para a segurança das infraestruturas computacionais, exigindo
novos mecanismos que combinem o best-of-breed para reagir contra as metodologias de
ataque emergentes. Nosso trabalho busca explorar os avanços na Cyber Threat Intelligence
(CTI) no contexto da arquitetura de redes definidas por software, ou em inglês, Software De-
fined Networking (SDN). Enquanto a CTI representa uma abordagem recente para o combate
de ameaças baseada em fontes confiáveis, a partir do compartihamento de informação e con-
hecimento sobre atividades criminais virtuais, a SDN é uma tendência recente na arquitetura de
redes computacionais baseada em princípios de modulação e programabilidade. Nesta disser-
tação, nós propomos IntelliFlow, um sistema de detecção de inteligência para SDN que segue a
abordagem proativa usando OpenFlow para efetivar contramedidas para as ameaças aprendidas
a partir de um plano de inteligência distribuida. Nós mostramos a partir de uma implementação
de prova de conceito que o sistema proposto é capaz de trazer uma série de benefícios em ter-
mos de efetividade e eficiência, contribuindo no plano geral para a segurança de projetos de
computação de rede modernos.
Keywords: Redes de Computadores, Redes Definidas por Software, Inteligência de Ameaça
Cibernética, Sistema de Detecção de Intrusos, OpenFlow.
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1 Introduction
The deployment of Internet services has increased immensely during the last years,
as well as the access of the users to these services, especially in cloud computing environments.
Consequences of these changes are that many adversaries designed new forms of attacks with
malicious intents, having as their main goals potential economic gains. Therefore, these threats
represent an attractive, new model of business for cyber criminals.
Figure 1 shows the more common data security concerns that cloud users face daily,
in where the five highest concerns are data-related with exception of Compliance and legal is-
sues. According to Cloud Security Alliance (2013), some of the top threats are: (i) Data Breach,
(ii) Data Loss, (iii) Account Traffic Hijacking, and (iv) Denial of Service (DoS). For example,
Snapchat (SNAPCHAT, 2015), the application to share data that are self-destructed in time, suf-
fered a data breach of approximately 200 000 user private photos because of a vulnerability
in the third-party client application called SnapSaved1, so that all stolen information was pub-
lished on Internet forums such as 4chan2. Another similar case of data breach was targeted to
Play Station network, whose damage was estimated to $4.6 billion (LIBERTY GLOBAL, 2012,
p. 27). On the other hand, recently Google announced data loss after lightning struck near
one of Google’s data centers affecting permanently some of their servers (GOOGLE. . . , 2015),
although this only affected a small portion of users, we must consider making backup of our
data as well. Regarding the account hijacking, we have the cases of the Cross-Site Script-
ing (XSS) bug found in Amazon that allowed attackers to hijack credentials from the website in
2010, and the leak of 6.5 millions of LinkedIn passwords in 2012 (DARK. . . , 2014). And with
regard to DoS attacks, businesses are at an high risk of being extorted by large criminal groups
that by using of network flood attacks they extort their victims forcing to pay large amount of
money (FBI. . . , 2015), e.g., the Distributed DoS for Bitcoin (DD4BC) criminal group has been
rapidly increasing both the frequency and the scope of its DoS extortion attempts, having as
target online casinos, banks, and trading platforms (ARBOR SERT, 2015). These are just some
of many threats whereby most organizations face daily.
New container-based technologies with high degrees of isolation and efficiency
have emerged and allow to combat some of these security problems. Those new schemes can
avoid certain problems around the isolation of the virtual machines, but are helpless in face of
other significant threats such as DoS or password guessing attacks. The main difference between
containers and traditional virtualization is that the former runs in a single process namespace,
sharing the same kernel of the main operating system (SOLTESZ et al., 2007). The best known
1 First report of the data leak to Snapchat. Source: “http://www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-hacked-the-
snappening-2014-10/”
2 An image-based bulletin board where anyone can post comments and share any kind of on-line images as well
as post comments. Source: “http://www.4chan.org/”
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Figure 1 – Cloud computing top threats. Adapted from data available in (CLOUD SECURITY
ALLIANCE, 2015, p. 10)
technologies based on containers include CoreOS, OpenVZ, Docker, among others. Docker has
become the most popular one and delivers containers to isolate applications with high network
throughput when compared to KVM (HUSSAIN, 2014). Figure 2 shows the network perfor-
mance comparison between a native machine, docker container, and KVM measured using the
iperf tool.
Despite the improvements in virtualization technologies, new attack techniques
continue to appear in virtual environments, so that security devices such as firewall are no
longer sufficient, due to new methodologies of the attackers, which have been improved greatly,
e.g., the actual threats are mostly directed to the network application layer, being often caused
by malicious insiders (INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY, 2007).
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are security devices whose function is to mon-
itor, analyze and detect anomalous traffic directed to the application and Internet layers. How-
ever, they are not able to prevent attacks, but only to alert the existence of them. Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPSs) together with IDSs filter malicious packets in a proactive or reactive
way. Both working together are known as Intrusion Prevention and Detection System (IDPS)
because of sometimes IPSs only function as IDSs.
For example, Snort (SNORT, 2015) is a typical IDS able to be configured as an
IPS to prevent attacks using the method of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). However, Snort has
certain performance limitations in high speed networks such as dropping packets or slowing
down the traffic (MEHRA, 2012).
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Figure 2 – KVM, Docker, and Native performance comparison. Adapted from data available in
(HUSSAIN, 2014)
Organizations, that deploy security devices on their networks, only detect and block
attacks which have been seen before, focusing on the event itself. However, they does not per-
form an analysis in depth of the methodology used by the attackers. These organizations do
not known that these attacks have a complex behavior and sometimes variable, in where the
attackers conduct a wide range of activities starting with the active and passive reconnaissance,
followed by the scanning, initial probes from zombie hosts, send small packets at a higher
speed, and when the threats are detected these malicious users simply change the malware used
(JOHNSON et al., 2014).
If organizations learn about the behavior of the attackers they could discover the
methodology used in the attack, thus the countermeasures would be more effective using the
knowing learned in the past by these same organizations. For this reason, the Cyber Threat In-
telligence (CTI) methodology emerged as an intelligent way to take advantage of the previously
analyzed information by trusted organizations. These data, known as intelligence, become
an important asset for organizations who want to proactively protect their services and networks
against new threats (ISIGHTPARTNERS, 2014, p. 3).
With the goal of improving the IDS analytic skills and to use the intelligence
provided by CTI, researchers developed Bro IDS (PAXSON, 1999), a powerful data analysis
framework that inspects all network traffic in depth in order to find suspicious activities. Bro
has the ability to run in high speed to capture data with a higher Gbps; Bro has also more
sophisticated signatures, a flexible scripts’s policy and, specially, an intelligent framework to
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receive data from other security sources.
Recently, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) (KREUTZ et al., 2015) has emerged
as a new paradigm in networking, providing a clean and programmatic separation of the control
and data planes. The OpenFlow protocol (FOUNDATION, 2014a) is the best known program-
ming interface to allow such separation of planes, enabling direct data plane device programma-
bility, not available before in a standardized, vendor-independent way.
In SDN, network switches become simple forwarding devices and the control logic
is implemented in a logically centralized controller. Nevertheless SDN security needs to be built
into the architecture to protect the availability, integrity, and privacy of all connected resources
and information, as well as to be delivered as a service (SCOTT-HAYWARD et al., 2013).
In the last years, many research projects related to SDN emerged as a result of the
flexibility in the SDN architecture, building applications in order to execute instructions to the
data plane and to reconfigure the flow tables of the switches that were affected.
1.1 Vision: Towards more secure and collaborative SDN
The methodologies to detect attacks using conventional IDS rules may help to main-
tain an organization protected once, but not necessarily will show good results. This is due to
the fact that the threats change over time. For example, a malware located at the blacklists of
security organizations, may change slightly its behavior in order to bypass the IDSs. In this
case, the traditional sensors will not be able to properly detect that attack. However, sharing
threat information between trusted organizations may help to resolve the weaknesses in the
IDSs. Therefore, changing the security model from reactive to proactive with CTI would allow
the organizations to understand the behavior of the attackers and develop countermeasures to
filter those attacks before they are executed.
Relying only in the blacklists provided by security organizations may be a problem.
This is because the shared threat information must be relevant, actionable3 and valuable for
the organization; otherwise it would not be useful (ISIGHTPARTNERS, 2014). The advantages
of using the CTI is not only to filter many threats, but also to know who are the adversaries,
how they operate, and what are the next steps to protect the networks against those attacks.
If the organizations take advantage of the SDN network abstraction layer and the cyber threat
intelligence framework, they could program Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that
allow them to generate countermeasures against attacks such as DDoS by interacting with the
underlying data plane devices. Our vision is that combining the CTI with SDN would allow the
protection of data in new cost-effective ways compared to traditional IDS-based solutions and
more efficient detection of attacks using the intelligence provided by reliable organizations.
3 Data that must be specific enough to trigger some type of response
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1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions
In this work, we propose IntelliFlow, an intelligent system of intrusion detec-
tion and prevention, that acts against different types of known threats in a proactive or reactive
mode. IntelliFlow aims at taking advantage of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) systems com-
bining known malicious information and IDS technology to create new security rules that allow
blocking malicious traffic by programming OpenFlow-based switches of the SDN architecture.
To this end, the objectives of the proposed IntelliFlow architecture include:
∙ Leverage Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) to add security service to SDN.
∙ Integrate the Bro’s Intelligence framework to acquire intelligence from reliable sources.
∙ Evaluate the IntelliFlow architecture for different scenarios, validating it with a proof-of-
concept implementation and experiments to assess effectiveness and performance.
1.3 Text Structure
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the literature review
and the related works. Chapter 3 gives the overview of the whole IntelliFlow architecture and
the intelligence framework. Chapter 4 describes the proof of concept and the experimental eval-
uations, and Chapter 5 present the conclusions of the dissertation.
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2 Literature Review
Initially, security devices were mainly intended to protect the IP layer against a set
of well-known attacks. Over time, these devices were not able to combat more advanced threats
directed to the transport and application layers. New detection techniques and devices were
built to counter these types of attacks, e.g., Intrusion Detection System (IDS). These security
devices often work together with firewalls to block a lot of threats found on the Internet, acting
as Intrusion Prevention and Detection System (IDPS).
Recently, more sophisticated ways to combat several threats have emerged, e.g.,
intelligence frameworks, stateful protocol analysis, statistical-based detection, and so on. In the
following sections, we describe the Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), and how these security
intelligence data can be used to filter many attacks. Finally, we discuss various advantages
related to SDN, and a brief description of the mode of operation of SDN applications.
This section covers the main relevant concepts behind our research proposal. The
first part deals with network monitoring by using Intruder Detection System such as Bro-IDS.
The second discusses the use of Cyber Threat Intelligence to share valuable information be-
tween the organizations. Then, finally, we talk about the concepts related to software defined
network as well as the different types of SDN applications.
2.1 Intruder Detection System
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a network device that allows to monitor, an-
alyze and detect possible attacks on the network infrastructure in terms of confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability (LIAO et al., 2013). These devices can be implemented in hardware
or software. However, IDS only reports suspected events, without guaranteeing an immediate
response to a specific attack.
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) not only automates the intrusion detection pro-
cess, but also filters malicious packets to block the source of the attack (SANS, 2004). Thus, an
IPS extends the IDS capabilities, so both work as a single system known as Intrusion Preven-
tion and Detection System (IDPS). Besides detecting threats, IDPS also fix with a vulnerability,
however they are unable to fix Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Those may only be
tackled with a complex set of measures involving the end-user provider’s set of routers. These
DDoS attacks are attempts to make an online service unavailable to its intended users.
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2.1.1 Intrusion Detection Methodologies
According to (LIAO et al., 2013), the Intrusion Prevention and Detection System
(IDPS) methodologies can be classified into three different types: anomaly-based detection,
signature-based detection and stateful protocol analysis. Most of these IDPS devices combine
these methodologies, in order to provide a more accurate analysis.
Anomaly-based Detection (AD)
This type of detection identifies events which do not agree with an expected pattern
or that are unusual, e.g., DoS or brute-force attacks. It usually works through the comparison
of profiles that represent a normal behavior against observed events, in order to identify some
type of anomaly. This normal behavior refers to an initial profile performed through an analysis
of the applications, network connections, computers or system users. By monitoring of the
network in short periods of time, profiles of some applications are developed to give evidences
of any unusual activity occurred in a specific time, e.g., tries of access to a malicious portal from
the internal network during a certain time of day. To counter anomalous threats, administrators
often generate statistical reports comparing the actual activity with the threshold of a normal
profile.
Anomalous detection works with two types of profiles: static and dynamic. The
static profiles are not usually changed, unless they are manually modified to generate news
profiles; therefore, sometimes they may become inaccurate, so they’ll need to be updated even-
tually. Unlike the static ones, the dynamic profiles are updated constantly as required; however,
they are exposed to attacks from malicious users. For example, an attacker may perform a pas-
sive scanning on different time points, slowly increasing the frequency of its attack. As a result,
the IDPS relies on this activity and it could be included on its profile. Another disadvantage is
the generation of many false positives because of a complex network environment where the
profiles were created incorrectly.
Signature-based Detection (SD)
This other type of detection compares each network’s event with patterns or strings
located at a local database of threats, thus avoiding attacks from known sources, e.g., a mali-
cious e-mail with an attachment file called money.exe and a subject “Get easy Money!” may be
tentative for users downloading and executing this virus; another example consists in receiving
brute-force attacks from scanner networks to a sever’s port 22. However, this type of detection is
ineffective at detecting unknown threats if the methodology is not properly used. For example,
if a malicious file was recognized as explore.exe by many signatures, an attacker may change
the name of the file to explore1.exe, causing the signature to search incorrectly for the file,
since it would be looking for its former name and not the current one. On the other hand, sig-
natures also lack the ability to understand why some application service stopped working. This
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is also known as knowledge-based detection. However, despite the disadvantages mentioned
above, the signature-based detection is greatly improved when used together with cyber threat
intelligence.
Stateful Protocol Analysis (SP)
This methodology compares profiles previously created for each protocol with ob-
served events, identifying some types of unusual activity on networks. It also natively decodes
any application-layer protocols, tracking the state of the whole network, e.g., pairing requests
with replies.
Unlike anomaly-based detection, it depends on vendor-developed global profiles to
specify protocols being used; For instance, when an user tries to access a TELNET service, the
session initially provides helping information or only asks for username and password; then,
depending on the code type that appears after entering the credentials, the IDPS may know if
the access was successful or not. Therefore, in the case of access refused repeatedly, it would
be considered suspicious.
Table 1 makes a comparison based on advantages and disadvantages of each intru-
sion detection methodology mentioned above.
In (SCARFONE; MELL, 2007), the authors present an advancing guide on IDS,
evaluate the different capabilities of the intrusion detector and provide recommendations for
designing, implementing, configuring, securing, monitoring, and maintaining of the IDSs.
2.1.2 Intrusion Detection Types
The IDSs are divided into different types of technologies, depending on the event
they are monitoring and on how they are deployed. In the next sections, we go through the four
most well known IDS types:
Network IDS (NIDS)
The NIDS is a network security system that monitors and analyzes network traffic
in order to identify suspicious activities. This security device captures packets from a mirror
interface using the Libpcap library and examine packets in real time. Figure 3a shows how
NIDS works together with the firewall to block attack attempts from the Internet.
Host IDS (HDIS)
Unlike NIDS, HIDS only monitors individual hosts. It is commonly deployed on
critical hosts, e.g., public servers containing sensitive information. Figure 3b shows how IDS
works on particular hosts inside of the internal network.
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Detection methodologies Advantages Disadvantages
Signature-based (Knowledge)
- Detect known attacks by
using patterns or strings.
- Simple method of detec-
tion.
- New attacks are not de-
tected in time.
- Little understanding of
the network or applica-
tions used.
Anomaly-based (Behavior)
- Identify events which do
not agree to some ex-
pected pattern.
- Detecting previously un-
known threats.
- New rules are difficult to
be created.
- False positives.
Stateful Protocol Analysis
(Specification-based)
- Identify and distinguish
unexpected sequences of
commands.
- Keep tracking of the au-
thenticator used of each
session and record it for
suspicious activity.
- Complex analysis and
an overhead involved in
performing a continuous
state tracking for many
simultaneous sessions.
- Incompatible of versions
against specific applica-
tions and operating sys-
tems.
Table 1 – Intrusion Detection Methodologies
(a) Network Based IDS
(b) Host Based IDS
Figure 3 – Network and Local IDPSs Types
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(a) Wireless IDS (b) Network behavior analysis
Figure 4 – Wireless and NBA IDPSs Types
Wireless IDS (WIDS)
WIDS monitors, analyzes and identifies certain malicious traffic on the wireless net-
work by capturing anomalous data coming from Access Points. However, they can not identify
malicious events on the application layer or protocols such as TCP or UDP, e.g., Packet injection
Aireplay-ng. Figure 4a shows a scenario of intrusion detection system with two mobile devices
connected to the wireless network. We note that the IDS device receives data from the access
point and then sends an alert message in the case of any anomalous threat being detected.
Network Behavior Analysis (NBA)
This system inspects monitored traffic in order to identify threats generating anoma-
lous traffic flows, such as DDoS, malwares, policy violations and so on. Its scope is on the or-
ganizational’s internal networks and sometimes also on the external networks. In Figure 4b, we
note that Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) provides capabilities to monitor the whole network
by analyzing data from switches or routers.
2.1.3 Detection Approaches
As the detection methodologies are becoming more complex, they are divided in
three subcategories including: computational approach, artificial intelligence and biological
concepts. However, the analysis of these approaches is of great complexity. Therefore, (LIAO
et al., 2013) presents a classification of five subclasses with an in-depth perspective on their
characteristics.
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Statistical-based Detection
This approach works by analyzing data traffic in real time and processing the infor-
mation with machine learning algorithms, in order to look for anomalies in established traffic
patterns. For instance, each event of the network has a particular anomaly’s level. If in a specific
moment, a certain anomaly is higher than the allowable threshold, then the IDS device would
generate an alert (FARSHCHI, 2010).
One of the advantages of this detection approach is the possibility to detect zero-day
attacks by sending alerts when there is an unusual activity in the network. Another noticeable
advantage is the detection of passive attacks, such as porn scanner attacks. Additionally, there
is no need to update signatures. However, the approach completely relies in learning patterns
generated by its own algorithms.
Pattern-based Detection
This approach monitors packets on the network and compares them with a database
of known attack patterns of threats. It consists of five modules: capture module, decode mod-
ule, detection module, known attack pattern module and action module (KSHIRSAGAR et al.,
2011). The first captures raw data of the internal network, the second decodes that data, the third
detects attacks from known sources, the fourth is a database in which the information on found
attacks created by the capture module is stored. Finally the fifth performs appropriate actions to
filter these attacks.
Rule-based Detection
This approach uses the anomaly and signature-based methodologies to decide if a
given behavior is considered an intrusion on host or network scenarios. The detection approach
detect unknown or known threats with a high performance of detection. The approach works
through the observation of events in the system, applying rules leading to a decision with regards
to a given pattern of activity suspicious (YANG et al., 2013).
State-based Detection
With the state-based detection, anomaly scores are computed to define the current
state of an associated event to the network. This approach only uses the anomaly detection to
determine an intrusion on host or network environments with a high detection performance. The
original idea behind state-based anomaly detection was that the detector would return a large
anomaly value when it found a missing transition, and return zero otherwise. But this is not
necessarily the best way to present the results of the detection, since users may want to adjust
the detector’s sensitivity. The detector should be able to return a number between zero and one
that somehow measures its confidence whether an intrusion is happening (CARCANO et al.,
2010).
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Heuristic-based Detection
This type of heuristic detection is also known as anomaly-based. It consists in build-
ing a model of acceptable behavior with certain exceptions. Its approach is used for efficient
detection of intrusion. For instance, when an administrator designs a determined behavior as
acceptable, the heuristic IDS will will also consider that behavior acceptable. Heuristics work
similarly to a common IDS. The IDS learns over time what types of traffic patterns are consid-
ered normal for your network. The heuristics feature then watches for anomalies in the traffic
pattern (SHAH, 2001).
In Table 2, we have a comparison between each detection approach according to its
methodology, detection type and detection of attack.
Approach Detection meth. Detection type Detection of attack
AD SD SP
Statistic-based X X - HIDS and NIDS Known and Unknown
Pattern-based - X - HIDS and NIDS Known
Rule-based - X - NIDS and WIDS Known
State-based X X X HIDS Known and Unknown
Heuristic-based X - - NIDS Unknown
Table 2 – Intrusion Detection Approaches
2.1.4 Open Source IDPS tools
Throughout the years, attacks have been improved with the use of more sophisti-
cated strategies, becoming more dangerous. Therefore, many efforts have been made by compa-
nies in order to improve threat combat technology, by developing security devices with evolving
strategies to block attacks. Currently, most companies use commercial hardware as security de-
vices, e.g., Cisco (CISCO. . . , 2015) offers an anomaly detection module against DDoS attacks,
IBM (IBM. . . , 2015) monitors and detects intrusions by extra sensor modules for the prevention
of attacks and blocking of packets.
On the other hand, the most famous open source IDSs are: snort (SNORT, 2015),
suricata (SURICATA, 2015) and bro (PAXSON, 1999). We will explain each of these open
source security devices in detail.
Snort
Snort is an open and free intrusion detection system capable of performing real-time
analysis and suspicious events logging. The packets are analyzed using signature databases or
anomalous detection methodologies.
This sensor works in three modes: sniffer, packet logger, and network intrusion
detection. The sniffer mode reads all allowed network packets to identify troubleshooting prob-
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lems, then displays them on a console. The packet logger mode stores analyzed packets into
a local directory. The last mode monitors the network traffic in real time, analyzing it regard-
ing rules previously defined by the user. Therefore, Snort will perform actions based on what
anomalous events it has detected before.
The architecture of Snort is based on four main components: Packet decoder, Pre-
processors, Detection engine, Alert generation. The packet decoder module filters packets from
any network for preprocessing by using AF_Packet module, and then sends the preprocessed
packets to the detection engine that, by using external rule set, generates alerts that are exported
to the Alert database module. Recently, Snort replaced its packet capture framework from Libp-
cap to AF_Packet, thus the performance was increased to 500MBit/sec (KHALIL, 2015). One
advantage is that Snort is supported by hardware platforms and operating systems. However,
Snort does not support load balancing across multiple CPUs, and it drops packets exceeding the
maximum capacity of a single CPU.
Suricata
Suricata is another open source, high performance intrusion detection system. This
technology also works as IPS and network security monitoring engine, similar to Snort. Unlike
Snort, Suricata supports both AF_Packet and PF_Ring for high-performance packet capture
and it also uses the standard capture PCAP. One advantage is that it is highly scalable, sup-
porting multi threated. Therefore, Suricata can run one instance and it will balance the load
of processing across all processors used. However, similar to Snort, Suricata only works with
signature-based rules.
Bro
Bro is a powerful network analysis framework with more advanced features than
other intrusion detection systems. For instance, it offers a policy script interpreter layer that ex-
ecutes a set of event handlers written in Bro’s own language; This permits taking actions when
attacks are found by the event engine, applying different policies such as dropping or redirect-
ing malicious packets. However, Bro still isn’t widely used by companies, because the learning
curve for implementing Bro can be steep for most users. The new version Bro 2.3 uses PF_Ring
for the line rate packet processing of 1 Gbps of transmission to 10Gbps of reception. Bro can
be configured for both NIDS or HIDS, inspecting all packets with its event engine. One of its
main advantages is that Bro supports intelligence from external sources using its intelligence
framework. The main goal of the framework is consuming data processed by security’s organi-
zations. The intelligence data can be loaded by an input framework that allows reading text files
with a defined format.
In Table 3 we make a comparison between these three most well known IDS. How-
ever, we chose Bro as our IDS device for testing, due to its flexibility in the description of its
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policies and supporting data intelligence.
Description Snort Suricata Bro
Multi-thread X X
Native IPS X
Own Language X
Operating system compatibility X X
High-speed monitoring X
Large user community X
Intelligence X
Table 3 – Comparison between IDPS solutions
2.2 Cyber Threat Intelligence
There are various concepts related to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) because of the
emerging space in which many organizations work to offer reliable data processing. According
to Gartner (MCMILLAN, 2013), CTI is a recent methodology of evidence-based knowledge
that organizations employ to identify and successfully respond to a cyber attack. It includes
context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice on emerging threats to
assets that can be used to inform decisions related to the subject’s response to the threat. In
addition, the FBI (FEDERAL. . . , 2015) considers that intelligence is the information that has
been analyzed and refined, so that it is useful to decision making on potential threats to the
information. Waltz (WALTZ, 1998) defines the intelligence as the information and knowledge
about an adversary, obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding the
same.
However, the security informations published on the Internet often are prone to
false positives because they are equating CTI with raw data information. For instance: a bad
IP address coming from an unreliable blacklist could result in an indicator wrongly employed
by organizations. Therefore, we believe intelligence is not simply any raw data: it is infor-
mation that has been analyzed and must be actionable; otherwise the information would no be
useful for organizations. In Table 4, we compare intelligence and information.
Intelligence Information
- Processed, sorted data. - Any raw and unfiltered data.
- Carefully analyzed by security analyst.
- Analyzed without a clear understanding of
security.
- Data are found from reliable sources. - Data are found from any unreliable source.
- Accurate, relevant, actionable and valuable.
- Data doubtfully reliable, incomplete or irrel-
evant.
Table 4 – Information versus Intelligence
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The techniques of cyber attackers have evolved during the last years, by using new
resources and developing new attack methods (FARNHAM; LEUNE, 2013). Unfortunately,
many intrusions remain undetected and, even in the case of them being detected, they will often
remain unpublished. This facilitates for malicious users to continue performing the same attack
patterns without disruption.
On the other hand, some organizations offer different types of intelligence, or even
most of them do not offer the required intelligence value; instead, they only provide some types
of raw information. Thus, a bad analysis of this information would generate any data but not
necessarily intelligence. Consequently, many false positives emerge caused by this misunder-
standing of the differences between raw information and intelligence.
To produce intelligence, a certain correlation is performed on the gathered data,
identifying malicious users and determining a confidence rating for each one of them; For in-
stance, a high confidence level, nearly 95% for a given IP address guarantees that such value
comes from a malicious user, and a low level confidence, close to 45%, can not assure a value
actually comes from a malign source.
Because of the rapid spread of threats, the value of CTI defined should be imme-
diately used to be analyzed at the time that the source of the attack was found. If CTI is not
used in time, its value can converge to zero within of few hours; For example: When an in-
stitution identifies some type of attack and successfully respond using the correct mitigation
procedure, it acquires an useful value, and this information can be shared within a set of trusted
organizations. Thus, another institution facing a similar problem would be able to rapidly de-
ploy countermeasures based on the experience acquired by another, thus intelligently preventing
attacks (JOHNSON et al., 2014).
2.2.1 Threat Intelligence Features
As of today, most organizations still rely on indicators found on the Internet. Though
this kind of data may be useful, it often does not represent a significant information value for
the organization. So a few years ago, the concept of intelligence emerged as a new security
space in which organizations could use data shared by other trusted organizations. Accordingly,
intelligence has seen a significant growth of its relevance in the last years. However, many
definitions recently appeared to define cyber threat intelligence, creating misunderstandings
between network administrators, whereby they often use raw data instead of intelligence. For
instance, security information provided by social network could be considered useful for some,
but not for others, though if the information has a considerable value for the organization, it is
named as intelligence. We base our definitions of intelligence through their five main features:
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Timely
The intelligence value is very high when it is used quickly. If it is used after some
days or even hours, its value could assume zero rapidly. Thus, if not employed in a reasonable
period of time, intelligence may become obsolete. On the other hand, if intelligence is used
within a acceptable time-span, it provides enough opportunity for an organization to anticipate
threats or prepare for an effective response.
Relevant
The intelligence should be applicable or useful for the organization. If it is not
relevant, it wont be considered intelligence, despite any other factors.
Accurate
The intelligence as value should be correct, complete to avoid false positives, false
negatives or irrelevant data. If these features are not fulfilled, the result could be a inappropriate
response or a false sense of security.
Specific
The level of understanding of the intelligence must be optimal, allowing the recip-
ient a good understanding about how the threat was detected and how the process was carried
out.
Actionable
The intelligence must be sufficiently clear to stimulate some response. It should
identify actions so organizations can counter threats or develop a suitable response..
2.2.2 CTI Methodologies
According to (FARNHAM; LEUNE, 2013), CTI can be classified in Strategic
or Tactical. Strategic focuses on the adversaries’ motivations in executing attacks. Tactical
is the ability to represent the intelligence in understandable terms. Its components are Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Indicator of compromise (IOC). TTP represents the be-
havior of the attackers including an understanding of such behavior along a time-frame. The
IOC (GRAGIDO, 2012) is an actionable data type observed on a network or computer, cate-
gorized by a certain confidence level. These indicators are classified in various types of CTI,
e.g., IP Address, Domain, URL, Files Hashes, Certificate Hashes, EMAIL, among others. We
describe the most commonly used IOC by adversaries, which are indicators we will use for
our experiments. For example: the IP indicators are malicious servers from the Internet that are
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represented by IP address; the Domain indicators are websites with malicious code such as mal-
ware, web pages with exploit code, web pages with driveby downloads (XU et al., 2014); and
finally the URL indicator, unlike of Domain indicators, it contains malwares on the allocated
website, however this indicator’s type blocks the URLs with malwares without needing to block
the entire domain itself.
2.2.3 Cyber Threat Intelligence Sources
SANS (FARNHAM; LEUNE, 2013) divides CTI into three categories: internal,
community and external.
Internal
This CTI refers to the internal process realized within the organization, which in-
cludes network servers such as firewalls, IPS as well as softwares like anti-viruses. These reports
comes from forensic analysis and are not often publicly available.
Community
The community category is often a closed group of organizations that share pro-
cessed and analyzed information through their trusted relationship. There are several of these
groups, e.g., REN-ISAC1 that promotes cybersecurity operation protection and response within
the research and higher education (R&E) communities.
External
This last category consists in external intelligence sources provided by private and
public organizations. The public sources are available to anyone interested in using it as input
source for their security devices. For instance: malware domains provide a list of malicious
domains found on the Internet, with lists regularly updated. The private sources are only avail-
able through payment, so it is important to subscribe to a reliable organization. For instance,
Emerging Threats offers subscription services for IDS rules and IP reputation.
2.2.4 Share Threat Intelligence
Currently there is not a standard mechanism to share intelligence between or-
ganizations, which makes the communication more complex between them. Most of these
organizations still share their data using CSV files and web servers with basic authentica-
tion (YOUNG, 2013). Others organizations have been using SMTP with GPG, which requires
previous authentication to validate messages sent to a secure channel. For this reason, different
1 Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Source:“http://www.ren-
isac.net/”
Chapter 2. Literature Review 33
format exchange mechanisms appeared as a standard for that the organizations can share data
between themselves.
Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF)
This methodology provides a structure similar to Location Identifier Separation Pro-
tocol (LISP) format to express information about events, attacks, and responses. It is used
like protocols to interchange intrusion detection information. However, it has become obso-
lete(IETF, 1998).
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
This methodology provides a way to share information between CSIRTs. The lan-
guage is based on XML structures. However, this framework has been interrupted and then
recontinued by Format for Incident Information Exchange (FINE) sponsored by IETF. The in-
terchange of information after the incidents are used to prevent future attacks (DANYLIW et
al., 2007).
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)
Unlike IODEF, this methodology defines the data format for the interchange of
information between IDSs. There are two protocols used to transfer the data between them.
The first Intrusion Alert Protocol (IAP) based on HTTP, and the second Intrusion Detection
Exchange Protocol (IDXP) (DEVARM et al., 2007).
Extended Abuse Report Format (X-ARF)
This methodology reports incidents via e-mail about network abuses. However, X-
ARF is not able to add multiple security events in a single message, and it is only allowed
messages with a specific target (SHAFRANOVICH et al., 2010).
2.2.5 Shared Threat Frameworks
There are multiples CTIs frameworks as well as security tools in order to combat
the cyber threats. However, they would not be useful if the inteligence is not relevant, actionable
and valuable for the goals of the organizations. In the next section we present the most important
frameworks that offer intelligence through a shared channel.
Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC)
Initially introduced by Mandiant (MANDIANT, 2015), then released as an open
standard. OpenIOC(OPENIOC, 2013) is a open framework for sharing threat intelligence. Ope-
nIOC is also composed by a community that provides advanced threat detection capability.
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One of the advantages of OpenIOC is its capability to offer the creation of its own
custom sets of indicators, so that organizations can describe technical characteristics to identify
either known threats, or an attacker’s methodology, or other evidences of compromise. Because
sophisticated threats require sophisticated indicators, OpenIOC also provides advanced threat
detection by using extensible XML schema.
Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS)
The VERIS framework (VERIS. . . , 2015) provides a common language for defining
and sharing incident information. One of the advantages of VERIS is that other organizations
can contribute data in a standard format to be used as a larger data set for deeper analysis.
According to (FARNHAM; LEUNE, 2013), VERIS can be divided into five sections: victim
demographics, incident description, discover & response, and impact assessment. Each one of
them has multiple elements with specific data types and variable names.
One of the advantages of VERIS is to be part of a community that adds intelligence
into a database available from Verizon (VERIZON, 2015). VERIS also is able to store data in a
custom format.
MITRE Standards
MITRE (MITRE. . . , 2015) makes use of three standards to complement the needs
of the CTI. The first is CybOX (CYBOX, 2015), a standardized schema for the specification,
capture, characterization, and communication of events that are observable in the operational
domain. The second is STIX (STIX, 2015), a structured language to represent the full range
of cyber threat information, which consists of 9 key constructs and the relationships between
them: observables, indicators, incidents, adversary TTP, exploit targets, courses of action, cam-
paigns, and threat actors. The latest is TAXII (CONNOLLY et al., 2014), a Trusted Automated
eXchange of Indicator Information, which defines a set of services and messages exchanges
for exchanging cyber threat information; In addition it also supports multiple sharing models to
push or pull transfer of CTI data.
Open Threat Exchange (OTX)
OTX (OTX, 2015) is widely considered the world’s first truly open threat intel-
ligence community that enables collaborative defense with actionable, community-powered
threat data. OTX is a centralized system for collecting intelligence, that is available at (ALIEN-
VAULT, 2015). The intelligence is provided by AlienVault and interoperates with Open Source
Security Event and Information Management (OSSIM) system to update the intelligence to
OTX.
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Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF)
CIF is a cyber threat intelligence management system (YOUNG, 2013) that com-
bines multiple known malicious threat informations from trusted organizations. CIF was devel-
oped by REN-ISAC2, and supported by a community where many developers contribute offer-
ing improvements in the system. One of the most advantageous features of CIF is its capability
for sharing threat intelligence data between multiple reliable organizations and general users,
through a client/server system. The IOC used by CIF are IP addresses, domains and URLs. CIF
is also able to export intelligence for specific security tools, such as Snort or Bro IDS. Finally,
CIF supports an intelligence framework to add more reliable data from trusted organizations.
Therefore, we can conclude that the intelligence frameworks aforementioned offer
interesting features to be used in CTI. In Table 5, we make a comparison between the multiple
frameworks, taking into consideration several factors such as the capacity to import and export
IOC, structured incident data in a standard format, among others features of the intelligence
framework.
Intelligence Framework OpenIOC VERIS MITRE OTX CIF
Import and export IOC from/to
other systems in a standard format
X X X
Import and Export structured inci-
dent data from/to other systems in
a standard format
X X X
Import, Export, Query and Man-
age CTI through CLI
X
Enforce data sharing based at-
tributes attached to CTI data
X
Support CIA when sharing data X X
Export and select data based on
creation dates of CTI data
X
Automatize to import and export
CTI data
X
Table 5 – Comparison between intelligence frameworks
2.3 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
Network architectures and devices are experiencing a significant growth in their
complexity due to requirements of modern deployments, cost pressures at buying and opera-
tion time, and new demands of Cloud-scale virtualized data center infrastructures (NADEAU;
GRAY, 2013). Recently, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) (KREUTZ et al., 2015) has en-
tered the networking scene as an architectural effort based on four main principles. Firstly,
control and data planes are decoupled. Secondly, forwarding decisions are no longer based on
2 Research and Education Networking Information Sharing and Analysis Center
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destination only but on multi-layer flow abstractions, allowing the unification of the forwarding
behavior of networking devices. Thirdly, the control logic is moved to external device(s) called
SDN controller(s), which build and maintain a global network view to facilitate the program-
ming of forwarding devices via standardized APIs (e.g. OpenFlow) to the forwarding devices.
Lastly, network applications interact with the data plane devices through an abstract network
view and higher-level APIs provided byt the SDN controller, easing the network programma-
bility. Figure 5 shows a generic SDN architecture decoupling the control and data planes, the
northbound and southbound interfaces, a global network view, and the abstract network view ex-
posed to the control applications. More information on the OpenFlow protocol specification and
the SDN architecture definition can be found in the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) orga-
nization in charge of related standardization and development work (FOUNDATION, 2014b).
In the present document, our focus is on the SDN control application.
Network Operating System
Global View Network
Network Abstraction
Northbound interface
Network Devices
Southbound interface
Network Applications
Abstract Network view
Control
Plane
Data
Plane
Figure 5 – SDN Architecture
The SDN application is becoming increasingly relevant. Developers and software
engineers may build applications running on the abstract network view by using the northbound
interface, and execute instructions on the forwarding devices by the southbound interface. One
of the advantages of SDN is that the Open SDN controller provides a network-wide view and
abstraction layer. We use OpenDaylight (OPENDAYLIGHT, 2015) as SDN controller because
it allows applications to control non-OpenFlow-enabled switches as well as OpenFlow-enabled
switches (FOUNDATION, 2014b).
SDN can work under both a reactive and a proactive application mode, depending
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on how the controller works to communicate with the data plane and the network applications.
Some SDN applications use both modes, reactive and proactive simultaneously. This application
type is often known as a hybrid application.
2.3.1 Reactive SDN applications
The reactive application works as follows: When a switch receives packets that
are not found in the flow table, these packets are encapsulated in PacketIN messages and
then forwarded to the appropriate controller. Then, a software application, running atop the
controller, resolves the requests made by the end-user node installing a rule on the switch, and
indicating the action taken when the same flows are sent again. The application usually executes
instructions to multiple switches at the same time, so that each switch will have a large set of
flow entries for each particular query.
According to (NADEAU; GRAY, 2013), reactive applications need to be asyn-
chronously notified of incoming packets that have been forwarded to the controller from switches.
Because of the asynchronous characteristic and of the fact the controller need to notify the ap-
plication of the events, the controller would act as a requester and the application as a responder.
Thus, it needs an interface to register a listener and then receive callbacks from the controller
when packets arrive. These listeners are able to receive notifications from the controller when
certain events occur. When the application is informed of an event, e.g., a change of port state,
the application has a chance to take some type of action. Figure 6 shows the reactive application
design, where the controller has a listener interface that is used by the application to provide
executing instructions on received packets.
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2.3.2 Proactive SDN applications
Unlike reactive, proactive SDN applications have the controller as responder and
the application as requester. These proactive applications are implemented using RESTful APIs
instead of using a listening interface. They also operate at different levels, depending on the
northbound-interface type being used, and are placed on Open SDN controller, and called by
the application.
In Figure 7, we show the proactive application design. As we can note, there is no
listener interface between the SDN controller and the application , but an application from the
controller that receives events about switches. These applications rely on queries from external
network events, e.g., SNMP, sflow, among others. One of the advantages of these applications
is the ability to retrieve the network information such as domains, switches, and hosts. The
interface offered by REST API is known as flow pusher, which allows the application to set
flow on switches (NADEAU; GRAY, 2013).
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2.3.3 Hybrid SDN applications
Hybrid applications work for both traditional networking and SDN protocols, oper-
ating them in the same environment. The OpenDaylight works with hybrid applications, allow-
ing to control legacy switches as well as OpenFlow switches. These applications allow users to
introduce new SDN technologies, such as OpenFlow, to their legacy environments. According
to (KREUTZ et al., 2015), switches that do not support OpenFlow require an understanding of
the level of SDN-via-APIs support that is available.
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2.4 Related Work
In (LOPEZ et al., 2014), the authors of BroFlow propose a system capable of react-
ing against DoS attacks in real time, combining an intruder detection system and an OpenFlow
application programming interface. BroFlow is an extension of the Bro architecture (PAXSON,
1999) with two additional modules, one for the security policies and the other for message coun-
termeasure. If a threat is found, POX (NOX, 2015) application either drops packets to eliminate
malicious events or uses an output to forward packets to a specific target. According to (FEL-
TER et al., 2014), one of the disadvantages of BroFlow is to use hardware virtualization based
on XEN instead of an operating system-level virtualization. Another is the use of reactive ap-
plications to counter DoS attacks, so it does not ensure effective response against that type of
attack.
Our work is different because we propose an intelligent mode to drop known threats
using proactive applications in the SDN environment using multiple isolated Linux systems (FEL-
TER et al., 2014).
In (LOBATO et al., 2014), the authors propose an elastic architecture for intrusion
detection and prevention. It uses certain mechanisms to detect anomalies on an intra-domain
network with multiple virtual networks. They employ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) for analyz-
ing packets as well as the balance of traffic directed to virtual machines. These virtual machines
perform intrusion detection and take action in case of malicious activity. By mirroring switch
ports, traffic is forwarded both to the original destination and to the IDS which is not directly
in the flow path. When the IDS discovers an attack, an alarm is sent to the controller indicating
the reconfiguration of the flow table. Similar to (LOPEZ et al., 2014), the work environment
is based on hardware virtualization instead of containers and does not focus on preventing the
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Our work scenario is not only intended to an
intra-domain environment, but also to an inter-domain, and makes effective use of cyber threat
intelligence as an important tool for defense against malicious users on the Internet.
SnortFlow (XING et al., 2013) is one of the early works on IDS and SDN, in order
to build a flexible IPS system in cloud virtual networking environments. SnortFlow is based on
the performance evaluation of the virtual machines, reconfiguring the network in case of any
abnormal activity. However, it only focuses on an intra-domain environment, with a snort agent
acting on the domain of the XEN virtualization platform.
Our proposal uses Bro (PAXSON, 1999) instead of Snort (SNORT, 2015) because,
Bro has the ability to run in high-speed environments and allows exchanging information in real-
time with other security applications (MEHRA, 2012), e.g., threats intelligence sources. Thus,
IntelliFlow takes advantage of Bro design’s ability to integrate with the intelligence framework,
in order to increase the database with sophisticated security rules.
SDNIPS (XING et al., 2014) is an IPS based on Snort and Open vSwitch (OVS).
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SDNIPS’s authors compare a SDN solution with the traditional IPS approach and shows that,
using SDN, the network reconfiguration designed by the controller enhances the prevention
flexibility. The authors demonstrated the SDN feasibility and efficiency over traditional ap-
proaches. However, different from our proposal, the authors use Snort as IDS. We believe that
IntelliFlow is a better alternative because it works in a proactive way, achieving optimal results
in terms of feasibility and efficiency over other similar proposals.
IPSFlow (NAGAHAMA et al., 2012) is a solution of IPS based on SDN/OpenFlow
with automatic blocking of malicious traffic. One of its advantages is the selective and dis-
tributed capture of traffic in the switches for data analysis by one or more IDSs. IPSFlow uses
an application named IPSFlowApp that allows communication with the controller of actions to
be taken. The main drawback of the proposal is the time taken to detect some attacks in the
network, since each IDS waits the confirmation of the controller to continue sending packets,
as it does not mirror interfaces. Thus, some mechanisms are required to send a copy to the IDS
for further analysis. IntelliFlow uses mirror interfaces to capture packages of the network in
search of malicious activity, then these packages are analyzed by Bro IDS and sent to the SDN
application.
Radware (RADWARE, 2015) is a commercial SDN application, which improves
the security, performance and availability by optimally forwarding traffic to deliver network
services. Their applications are dedicated to specific hardware platforms and support network
throughputs up to 40Gbps. The main disadvantage of this system is the high cost of purchasing
one of these products, e.g., Defense Flow and Defense Protection. Another drawback is the time
taken for learning to properly use the tool. Our proposal uses a simple network architecture
based on open source and proactive applications using SDN.
In (FELTER et al., 2014), the authors propose a performance comparison between
the traditional virtualization technology (Virtual Machines) and Linux Containers (LXCs). The
main difference is that the VMs run a full Operating System on a virtual hardware. Unlike VMs,
the containers modify an existing Operating System (OS) to provide extra isolation. The authors
conclude that containers such as docker (DOCKER. . . , 2015) have equal or better performance
than VMs. For that reason, we use Docker in our work environments.
In (BRAGA et al., 2010), the authors propose a lightweight procedure to extract
feature information needed for traffic analysis in order to detect DDoS attacks. They use SDN
with OpenFlow to achieve low overhead. IntelliFlow offers better methods for DDoS attack
detection and a lower rate of false positives compared to other proposals.
SciPass (BALAS; RAGUSA, 2014) proposes an OpenFlow application to transport
“clean” data such as large scientific data and send it to its destination without going through
firewalls and other security devices that introduce performance hits. SciPass improves the data
transfer and reduces the load on network infrastructure. Evaluations are performed taking into
account proactive and reactive modes. The authors compare the throughput of the proposal with
Chapter 2. Literature Review 41
the conventional firewall method in the proactive mode. The results were such that the reactive
bypass performance doubled throughput of firewall in 250ms, while with an equivalent through-
put the transfer performance achieved 1.5s without a firewall. The disadvantage of SciPass is
that proactive rules are manually created, according to the attacks on the network. IntelliFlow
uses an intelligent system to create security rules automatically.
The table 6 comparison each proposal in terms of mode of action, main contribution,
countermeasures, and inter-domain.
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3 IntelliFlow Architecture
This chapter introduces IntelliFlow, the proposed intelligence system that aims to
detect, prevent and/or react against security incidents in Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
environments. IntelliFlow leverages mechanisms of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) technolo-
gies and BroIDS to proactively drop different types of Internet threats. IntelliFlow also works
in a reactive way against threats that have not been proactively blocked but are stored in the
so-called knowledge plane.
3.1 Architecture
As shown in Figure 8, the IntelliFlow architecture is composed of the following
modules: Process Connectors, Decider, False Positive, Intelligence Framework, Knowledge
Plane, Flow Mapping, and IntelliFlow application. The remaining components present in the
figure are either part of the original Bro IDS or the SDN controller architectures. IntelliFlow
reads intelligence feeds by using both the Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF)1 and Bro
IDS input framework.
- Process Connectors is the module responsible for receiving notifications from Bro IDS
about a possible threat. In addition, it removes certain inconsistencies in the notifications
and sends them to the Decider module.
- Decider is the module which takes a decision according to the type of analyzed informa-
tion, deciding if the resulting notification comes from a known or unknown source. In the
case of a known source, this data is sent to the Intelligence Framework, otherwise it is
sent to the Notice Framework.
- False Positive is the module responsible for deciding whether an unknown source is a
false positive or not. It is based on the logic of a detection algorithm, which defines the
number of times (threshold = 10) that our system can resist to take no corrective actions
against a supposed attack. For example, if the number of times a threat executes attacks
exceeds the threshold, countermeasures are executed using the Bro detection algorithm
together with the Notice Framework to drop those attacks immediately.
- Intelligence framework (IF) processes and handles all the intelligence from known
sources and the resulting information is represented in terms of Bro internal data struc-
tures that we refer to Knowledge Plane (KP). Figure 9 shows how the intelligence Frame-
work works.
1 Collective Intelligence Framework. Source: http://csirtgadgets.org/collective-intelligence-framework/
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Figure 8 – IntelliFlow Architecture
- Knowledge Plane (KP) is a module that collects and stores information of known or un-
known threats previously processed and analyzed by the Intelligence and Notice Frame-
works respectively. The KP’s information is used by the flow mapping module to translate
the Bro fields into OpenFlow flow rules. Figure 10 shows how the KP works: after receiv-
ing the intelligence obtained by CIF as input, exported OpenFlow flows and sent as
output. In addition, the KP allows Bro-IDS queries of analyzed data.
- Flow Mapping is a module that performs the flow mapping of the stored data by KP and
then sends its information translated to the IntelliFlow API.
- IntelliFlow API is an API of the network application layer. It receives values from the
flow mapping module to create the flow reconfiguration actions on the affected switches.
3.2 Mode of Operation
As discussed in Chapter 2.3, SDN applications can be broadly divided into three
types of depending in the mode of operation they work. In addition, our requirement is to
allow SDN applications to interact with IDS detection approaches as discussed in Chapter 2.1.3.
Hence, IntelliFlow uses RESTful APIs for SDN proactive mode of application together with
IDS that can be either based in reactive and/or proactive detection approaches. The resulting
mode of operation allows to create proactive security rules based on the learned intelligence,
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and reactive rules based on some anomalies found in the network. Below, we define both modes
of operations and discuss their main advantages and disadvantages.
3.2.1 Reactive
When a new flow comes into the switch, the OpenFlow does a lookup in its flow
table. If no match is found for the packet, the switch creates a PACKET-IN packet and sends it
to the controller for further processing. This mode of operation is used by most IDSs, because
they often work using the IDS’s methods based on reacting an instant after an attack is executed.
The main advantages is that new attacks can be filtered as soon as an anomaly is found in the
network. The disadvantage is that this mode of operation may generates many false positives.
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3.2.2 Proactive
The proactive approach is commonly used by the CTI communities to proactively
block all threats considered dangerous. The advantage of this approach is that, if we understand
the adversaries, we can develop tactics to counter attacks proactively. The disadvantage is that
we need to constantly update the KP based on the security feeds.
3.3 Input Framework
Bro provides an interface between its event engine and the CIF intelligence data,
known as Input Framework. This interface is able to read intelligence files formatted into a bro
table, and then send it to the Intelligence framework for processing. To accomplish reading the
file, we add the absolute file path in the Bro local site policy as shown below:
redef Intel::read_files += { “/home/bro-ids/INTELLIGENCE/intelligence-data.intel”, };
3.3.1 Intelligence Sources
As shown in Section 2.2, there is a notable difference between intelligence and in-
formation. However, there are many websites on the Internet that still publish security informa-
tion without a deep analysis of the data. Here, we only show a list of three reliable intelligence
sources, which have been properly analyzed, and that are used by the CIF server for loading in
its configuration file to generate reliable security feeds. Then, these feeds are used as input for
our KP.
- Malware Domain List (MDL) is a non-commercial community project, that publishes
malicious domain information containing malwares.
- Alienvault is a commercial organization focused on providing network security to large
companies. This reliable organization owns a threat intelligence laboratory containing an
unified security management platform to identify the last malicious hosts from Internet.
- Spamhaus is a trusted organization that provides cyber threat informations to security
devices in order to prevent different type of attacks from Internet. For example: Spamhaus
Block List (SBL) is a database of IP addresses that acts as spam. Exploit Block List (XBL)
is a realtime database of IP addresses that were infected by malwares, and that are being
controlled by a botnet master. Policy Block List (PBL) is a DNS black list database that
have no reason to be delivering unauthenticated SMTP emails to any internet mail server.
PBL provides a central repository of dynamic IP’s and that are not maintained directly by
Spamhaus.
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3.3.2 Intelligence types
These intelligence types are threat indicators where malicious users use to be effec-
tive their attacks. There are a lot of types of intelligence, but we only show three of them because
they are more used by organizations, and that also are the indicators used in our experiments on
Chapter 4.
IP Address
The IP-based threats often come from botnet networks, or from scanner networks
and malwares. The way to detect these threats using CIF is:
$ cif -q infrastructure/botnet -c 85 -p bro
$ cif -q infrastructure/scan -c 85 -p bro
$ cif -q infrastructure/malware -c 85 -p bro
Domain
The Domain-based threats are located in remote bot servers infected with malwares.
Many times, the domain names are difficult to detect because these modern bots talk to Com-
mand&Control servers (C&Cs) whose domain names are generated randomly and might be
valid for a single day only or maybe a few hours only, rendering a centralized source utterly
useless. However, several of the reliable sources update their threat informations each hour or
day. The way to detect these threats using CIF is:
$ cif -q domain/botnet -c 85 -p bro
$ cif -q domain/malware -c 85 -p bro
URL
Similarly to Domain, the Url-based threats are located in remote servers infected
with malwares or phishing. These servers contains different types of malwares within a pre-
defined path of the URL. Often they are used to infect the computers of their victims with
malwares. The way to detect these threats using CIF is:
$ cif -q url/malware -c 85 -p bro
$ cif -q url/phishing -c 85 -p bro
3.4 IntelliFlow Implementation
In order to implement our proposed architecture, we developed an API in Python
that acts on the SDN application layer. This implementation can be well used for both local
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environment as well as different domain’s environments. In Chapter 4, we will explain in more
detail where the IntelliFlow API can be implemented. In the next sections, we describe the
procedures used for flow mapping and reconfiguration of OpenFlow flows.
3.4.1 Bro IDS Input Fields
Once Bro executes the monitoring of live traffic on a mirrored network, it produces
several types of human-readable ASCII log files, properly classified according to the event being
triggered. Each different event produces a file with a defined output format; these are controlled
by the logging framework. This allows fine-grained control of what situation generated which
event and the reasons behind how it was produced (PAXSON, 1999). Bro also warns anomalous
or potentially interesting situations produced by the Notice Framework. These events are shown
in a Notice.log file.
On the other hand, the intelligence data are handled by the Intelligence frame-
work in conjunction with the Input framework, in order to log hits seen on a specific network
and to send the results of the analysis to a formatted file called intel.log. The intelligence
data are read off disk by calling the constant read_files located in the Bro’s input frame-
work. In addition, Bro needs to load scripts located within the intelligence framework default
directory. The fields shown in the intelligence file are shown in Table 7.
Field Description
id.orig_h Connection originator’s endpoint IP address
id.orig_p Connection originator’s endpoint TCP/UDP or ICMP code
id.resp_h Connection responder’s endpoint IP address
id.resp_p Connection responder’s endpoint TCP/UDP or ICMP mode
seen.indicator The indicator that triggered the match, e.g., a malicious IP.
seen.indicator_type The indicator type that represents a threat, e.g., DOMAIN
seen.where Location where the event was triggered, e.g., DNS:request
Table 7 – Bro fields
We emphasize the use of the seen.indicator field because it give us clues of
where the attack was originated. In addition, we also emphasize the seen.indicator_type
and seen.where fields because these generate the indicator type and location’s service in which
the event was triggered respectively.
The seen indicator, also known as Indicator of compromise (IOC), can be one or
more hosts or networks that are identified as actors suspected of an attack. Those are determined
through a process of rigorous analysis realized by security experts.
The types of indicators supported by Bro are shown in (PROJECT, 2015). In the
present work, we only use the following types of IoC: Intel::ADDR, Intel::DOMAIN, In-
tel::URL, because we consider that they are the indicators more used by organizations that
share intelligence on the Internet. With regard to where the data were discovered, we use
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certain parameters to determine the origin of the attack, e.g., Conn::IN_ORIG, Conn::IN_RESP,
HTTP::IN_HOST_HEADER, and HTTP::IN_URL. In Table 8, we show the relation between
the Bro indictator types with their respective localizations where the threat is found:
Indicator Type Localization
Intel::ADDR Conn::IN_ORIG and Conn::IN_RESP
Intel::DOMAIN HTTP::IN_HOST_HEADER
Intel::URL HTTP::IN_URL
Table 8 – Indicator types used by our proposal
3.4.2 OpenFlow Output Flows
This section describes the entries of the OpenFlow flow tables used by the Intel-
liFlow application. As this table varies depending of the OpenFlow version, we use the latest
OpenFlow 1.3, which contains seven main components shown in (FOUNDATION, 2014a). Two
of them identify a unique flow in a specific flow table: a match field entry to match against
packets, and a priority entry to match precedence of the flow entry. The instructions flow
entry contains actions to be performed on the packet, such as dropping packets or forwarding
them to another target. In Table 9 we have a description of each flow used by our API. We can
see that there are some values used by default that are necessaries to build the new OpenFlow
flows.
Flow Value used Description
dl_type 0x800 Matches ethernet protocol type ethertype
nw_proto 6 Matches IP protocol type proto
nodeid any Bridge’s mac address
priority 0-65535 The order that an entry will match in comparison to other
nw_src any Matches the source IP address
nw_dst any Matches the destination IP address
tp_src any Matches the TCP source port
tp_dst any Matches the TCP destination port
actions any Represents a list of actions done on a packet when its entry has
been matched
Table 9 – OpenFlow flows
3.5 IntelliFlow Countermeasures
The countermeasures sent by the IntelliFlow API are based on the sending of flow
data to the SDN controller using the HTTP PUT method and the module Requests of Python.
The execution of the API automatically corrects certain malicious activity sent to the network,
by adding new entries with action field drop for dropping malicious flows, and output for
forwarding the bad flows to a specific output interface, belonging to a HoneyPot server.
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In the frame below, we note that the sending of flow data to the controller passes
through four parameters: url, data, headers, authentication. The URL indicates the path where
the controller flow administration is found. The data parameter contains the new flow, without
encryption, that will be passed to the controller for processing. The header gives more specific
information on the request. And, the auth parameter gives us the option to include the creden-
tials of access from OpenDaylight server.
r = requests.put(url, json.dumps(d), headers=‘Content-Type’ : ‘application/json’,
auth=(‘username’, ‘******’))
One essential part of our work consists in defining new flows according to the event
triggered. For example, the new flow created for a Denial of Service attack is different from the
one created for blocking malicious websites. Therefore, we create four different functions for
each experiment being analyzed. Each function reads the last intel.log alarm file created by
Bro.
Regarding the flow mapping, it is performed by translating the intelligence values
from Bro to OpenFlow parameters, in order to create new OpenFlow flows. To differentiate a
flow from another, we use a different priority value for each one. Thus, flows created will not
be duplicated and can be interpreted by OpenFlow switches.
Finally, these flows created are sent to the controller by the RESTful application and
the Northbound interface. The pseudocode of IntelliFlow details how the application is built to
detect and drop attacks from known sources.
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Pseudocódigo 3.1 Detection of different threats by using of the proactive approach
α = The indicator that triggered the match “seen.indicator"
β = The type of indicator “seen.indicator_type"
γ = Location in Bro’s where the event triggered “seen.where"
δ = Connection originator’s endpoint IP address “id_orig"
θ = Connection responder’s endpoint IP address “id_resp"
ψ = Array of the set of indicators already used
η = Honeypot Server to study the features of the attack and to replicate the victim server.
if β == Intel::ADDR and γ == Conn::IN_ORIG then
α ← δ
if (α,θ) /∈ in ψ then
Dropping “α” of the flow tables and forwarding it to “η"
Including (α,θ) in ψ
else
Nothing to do
end if
else if β == Intel::ADDR and γ == Conn::IN_RESP then
α ← θ
if (δ ,α) /∈ in ψ then
Denying access to the remote service “α” and forwarding it to “η"
Including (δ ,α) in ψ
else
Nothing to do
end if
else if β == Intel::DOMAIN or Intel::URL then
α ← is a malicious website
if γ == HTTP::IN_HOST_HEADER or γ == HTTP::IN_URL then
if (δ ,α) /∈ in ψ then
Denying access to the malicious site “α” and forwarding it to “η"
Including (δ ,α) in ψ
else
Nothing to do
end if
else
Nothing to do
end if
else
Nothing to do
end if
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4 Prototype and Experimental Evaluation
In this chapter, we present the proof-of-concept implementation as well as a series
of experiments to validate and evaluate the IntelliFlow architecture considering both reactive
and proactive modes of operation.
4.1 Proof of Concept Implementation
To validate the proof of concept, we designed two types of work scenarios imple-
mented on our INTRIG1 laboratory infrastructure, which are: Intra-domain and Inter-domain
Ssenarios. These are composed ofscentainers (DOCKER. . . , 2015), virtual switches (PFAFF
et al., 2009) and virtual machines on KVM. This implementation also allows the coexistence
of multiple parallel virtual networks, each one executing several services, based on the ODL
SDN controller, that sends instructions to each virtual network in order to modify the be-
havior, by using of OpenFlow protocol, on the vSwitches (OVS) to which the containers are
attached to. Application scripts and other codes related to the present work is available at
“https://github.com/richardqa/IntelliFlow”. We refer to the organizations that publish threats
found on the Internet as just “organizations”, container-based virtualized systems that are at-
tacked by malicious users as just “victim”, known threats as just “threats” and security filters as
“intelligence” in this text.
4.2 Testbed
Figure 11 shows the testbed for KVM servers whose components are CIF server, a
master Bro-IDS and an OpenDaylight Controller. With regard to the testbed for Linux contain-
ers, we have the scenario shown in Figure 12, that simulates Bro IDS sensors, victim servers
and several malicious hosts. Both the KVMs and containers use Ubuntu 14.04 as operational
system, including the machine that hosts all these services that we call as main server. Re-
garding virtual bridges, we use Open vSwitch 2.3 because it allows the programming the data
plane by using the OpenFlow protocol. Moreover, Open vSwitch also provides the interaction
with docker through pipework2. We also use the OpenDaylight controller, because it supports
an extensive collaborative community based on open source and because also provide REST
interfaces which makes possible to program flows from external applications. And finally a
HoneyPot server for data analysis in deep of the anomalies found on the network.
1 A network laboratory interested in the state-of-the-art of Internet technologies and innovation.
Source:“http://intrig.dca.fee.unicamp.br”
2 A lightweight tool that allows you connect together containers in arbitrarily complex scenarios through
cgroups and namespace. Source: “https://github.com/jpetazzo/pipework”
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Figure 11 – Testbed for KVM servers
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Figure 12 – Testbed for containers
Both hard disk and memory size together with their IP addresses for each virtual
KVM are shown in Table 10. This figure also shows the capacity of the machine that hosts all
virtual machines.
We simulate different services and software applications for each LXC, e.g., Scan-
ners, Botnet and Web Services. The malicious containers use different range of addresses be-
cause we simulate a set of attacks executed at the same time.
Containers CIF Master Bro Controller Main Server
IP Address 192.168.122.2 192.168.122.3 192.168.122.4 192.168.122.1
Memory 8GRam 2GRam 4GRam 16GRam
Hard Disk 100GBytes 20GBytes 20GBytes 1TBytes
Table 10 – Values used for the servers virtualized on KVM
4.2.1 Intra-Domain Scenario
Figure 13 shows the intra-domain scenario composed of three different Virtual Net-
works (VNs), each of them VN-1,VN-2 and VN-3 contains a local Bro IDS that monitors the
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incoming and outgoing traffic from its own network, reporting alert messages to the KP at dif-
ferent times T11,T12,T13 respectively.
On the other hand, the information of external threats is provided by a CIF server
through its intelligence mechanism and sent to the KP. Hence, both alert messages m1,m2,m3
and threats coming from external sources compose the Input source of the KP. The commu-
nication channel between CIF and master Bro is performed by RSync3 protocol. Subsequently,
Master Bro feeds our KP with different informations of malicious events that are harmful to the
networks.
KP
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Figure 13 – Intra-domain Scenario
We assume that the time taken for translating Bro packets to OpenFlow flows is
expressed as T2 and the reconfiguration of malicious flows on bridges affected is T3. Thus, the
total time spent by our proposed system for dropping one of those threats, is calculated by the
sum of T1 + T2 + T3, being T1 either T11 or T12 or T13. When working with threats, the time
T1 is less in the proactive mode, because these threats have already been previously configured
to be dropped before they are executed. Unlike the proactive mode, the reactive analyzes the
threats looking for some anomaly or signature that can be used for dropping malicious flows;
therefore, it spends more time detecting some particular attack.
We classify the reactive methodologies in two modes: with and without intelligence.
The first one reacts in a intelligent way, using the Input framework to read the intelligence from
a text file, and the Intelligence framework for processing, so known sources are dropped
rapidly. The second one offers the capacity of reacting against attacks based on the analysis of its
event engine and script interpreter, inspecting all the network traffic looking for any subnormal
activity. Instead, the intelligent methodology monitors all its data traffic, making a comparison
3 File transfer program capable of efficient remote update via a fast differencing algorithm. Source:
“http://rsync.samba.org”
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of the received information against the known attacks database and previously processed by
reliable security organizations.
4.2.2 Inter-Domain Scenario
Our system can also be applied to an inter-domain scenario shown in Figure 14,
which includes three virtual networks configured from different administrative domains, and
a network management that receives security alerts from reliable organizations in conjunction
with a Honeypot for analyzing of unknown threats. In this scenario, the network management
entity uses CIF as an intelligence framework, which is responsible for parsing, normalizing,
storing, post processing, querying, sharing and producing data sets of threat intelligence. The
other three domains receive the data processed by CIF over a period of time of five minutes.
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Figure 14 – Inter-domain Scenario
The idea behind centralized feeds, is to automate the sending of actionable data to
a single centralized Bro server that hosts to our KP. This server receives all threat information,
normalizes and produces feeds to be shared to the other networks such as LAN-1, LAN-2,
and LAN-3. We use the Rsync file-copying tool together with the SSH protocol to keep the
intelligence synchronized among these multiples domains. Thus, each domain will update its
database with the latest source of intelligence available on the Internet.
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Most of organizations often publish their reputation-database lists in a period of
time of one hour approximately, each one containing enough information about a particular
threat, so users may query this intelligence for their own further analysis. In this work, we use
the CIF Server, an intelligence framework that allows to make queries against different rep-
utation’s databases by using Google Protocol Buffer (GPB). This framework is also able to
maintain different sources of data synchronized, marking each one with a particular confidence
rating. The GPB allows better performance compared with XML or JSON. The organizations
that contribute with intelligence to CIF update their data using a confidence rate from 0 to 100%
and in interval of one hour. However, our CIF server loads intelligence data each five minutes
and enables to generate processed data to the KP in a period of 45 minutes. In the frame below,
we show the procedure used to automate the intelligence feeds used by CIF server, also it shows
the frequency to pull feed data is each 5 minutes, and to generate the feeds to be sent to the KP
is of 45 minutes.
# Pulling the feed data
05 * * * * /opt/cif/bin/cif_crontool -p hourly -P -d -A root »/var/log/cif/crontool_hourly.log
2>&1
# Feeding the data generation in the CIF server
45 * * * * /opt/cif/bin/cif_feed -d »/var/log/cif/cif_feed.log 2>&1
NOTE:
#cif_crontool: Tool used for importing external data.
# The configure lines is located in the file ‘/etc/crontab’.
Then, these feeds are gathered at the KP as intelligence, and by using of the
Rsync synchronization tool and the SSH authentication protocol we can maintain updated the
local KP of each VN. Below, we show the procedure used to generate SSH cryptographic keys
and how to transfer fast intelligence by using of Rsync. This tool also copies remote files from
the CIF server to the main Bro IDS using the SSH authentication agent together with the Rsync
and SSH.
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# Step 1: Both CIF and main Bro generate GPG keys in order to create a relationship between
them.
ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -C “This is my new KEY”
# Step 2: Each one shares its own public key through the SCP command.
CIF$ scp ∼/cif/.ssh/id_rsa.pub bro@192.168.122.3:/home/bro/.ssh/authorized_keys
BRO$ scp ∼/bro/.ssh/id_rsa.pub cif@192.168.122.2:/home/cif/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Step 3: Configure SSH-Agent in order does not have to enter the passphrase each time you
make a ssh or scp connection.
exec /usr/bin/ssh-agent $SHELL
ssh-add (enter the passphrase)
Enter passphrase for /root/.ssh/id_rsa:
Identity added: /root/.ssh/id_rsa (/root/.ssh/id_rsa)
# Step 4: As both were identified like trusted servers, we launch directly the Rsync command
on CIF Server
rsync -az --delete /home/cif/INTEL/ 192.168.122.3:/home/bro/IntelliFlow/
NOTE:
#The path “/home/bro/IntelliFlow” contains the list of Indicators of compromise (IOCs) ob-
tained from CIF Server.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate six different types of attacks: brute-force, dictionary, botnets, scanners,
malicious domains, and URLs. The first four attacks use ADDR as IoC, the fifth attack (malicious
domains) use DOMAIN as IoC and the sixth attack (malicious URLs) use URL as IoC. These
experiments are based on the methodology presented in Chapter 3.
Our proposal aims to protect the network against threats mentioned above by using
both methodologies: proactive and reactive with intelligence. The first methodology uses new
security filters to be pro-actively added to each OpenFlow virtual switch before a new threat,
detected by our intelligence framework, is executed against victim servers. For example, when
one of these attacks is launched, the victim or victims do not receive malicious packets, because
these are immediately blocked by the corresponding bridge before they can affect any of these
servers. What is then reported is only the packets going to Bro IDS sensor through the mirror
interface and its event engine. The second methodology intelligently reacts against threats that
are not found at the Knowledge plane, responding to an anomaly at the detection engine. For
example, at the time an attack is launched, the local Bro-IDS sensor looks to match threats in
the local KP. If no attack is found, Bro queries to the shared KP about the attack. And, if the
threat is found, Bro automatically sends a security alarm generating an Intel.log file to the KP,
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then the IntelliFlow API executes countermeasures, reconfiguring the flow table of the affected
switch dropping any next malicious activity coming from the same source.
The reliable organizations provide the types of threat indicators, that will be peri-
odically added to the shared KP, and therefore to the local KP of each VN in a period of time of
five minutes, hence IntelliFlow constantly will read the information contained in its local KP,
dropping malicious flows in the bridges. As a benefit, the bridges will be prepared to drop any
malicious flow coming from these known sources. Despite the methodology with intelligence
has an extensive information database, this methodology consumes less computing processing
evaluated for different amount of malicious hosts.
Both automate tools, preventing or reacting against different adversaries, and drop-
ping the majority of malicious packets directed to vulnerable servers within the shortest time
possible. By the time we block these packets, our system will also have forwarded all the traffic
to a HoneyPot Server, in order to understand how they operate and what specific steps we should
do to protect our data. Alike, we are making a more efficient use of the time, e.g., to counter
a small cyber-crime group, we would require a different time compared with a big group of
dangerous criminals. Therefore, our work joins the cyber threat intelligence with the reactive
methodology to drop the most of packets that were previously analyzed by other reliable orga-
nizations. As shown in Figure 12, we enabled six test servers: SSH, FTP, LDAP, HTTP, VNC
and SMTP which are exploited by sophisticated hacking tools such as Hydra4 for brute-force
and dictionary attacks, Hping35 for DDoS attacks and Nmap6 for port scanning attacks.
The communication between each Bro IDS, controller, and CIF is through a ded-
icated channel by using of the SSL protocol, ensuring an secure and isolated communication
between them. The countermeasure messages are in the JSON format, and these contain flow in-
formations such as “destination and source IPs”, “destination port”, “ethertype”,
“priority”, and the “protocol field” that indicate the actions to match against a specific
flow. To simulate the behavior of these attackers, we designed a script in bash that executes
instructions from master docker through the “docker exec” command. For more reliable re-
sults, each experiment is executed ten rounds, varying the number of containers involved at the
attack from 1, 5, 10, 20, and 40 for password-guessing attacks, and from 1, 5, 10 bots for DoS
attacks.
In order to explicitly evaluate the proposed IntelliFlow architecture, we propose
four study cases that include both methodologies. In the next sections, we demonstrate the
use of the methodology reactive with intelligence applied to counter each type of threat previ-
ously mentioned, also we make a comparison between each one of them with the conventional
4 A very fast network logon cracker which support many different services. Source: “https://www.thc.org/thc-
hydra”
5 Network tool able to send custom TCP/IP packets and to display replies like ping program does with ICMP
replies. Source: “http://www.hping.org”
6 Open source tool for network discovery and security auditing. Source: “https://nmap.org”
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methodology. Throughout these proposed experiments, we intended to find answers to ques-
tions such as: How fast can attacks be detected?. How effective are the proposed methods?. Our
proposal also can be applied of a hybrid mode, using functionalities of the proactive mode, auto-
matically dropping known threats, and of the reactive mode with intelligence executing scripts
for reconfiguring the flow tables as soon as that a threat is detected on the network.
4.3.1 Mitigation of Brute-force and Dictionary attacks
To perform this first experiment, we evaluate two types of password-guessing at-
tacks, which are brute-force and dictionary-based, and that are launched from the main server.
They work in an automatized and distributed way, launching their attacks to authentication
servers such as SSH, FTP, LDAP, and so on, in order to gain illegitimate access to user accounts
of the companies or personal user accounts such as Gmail, Facebook, or Yahoo.
These types of attacks do not act by directly looking for a flaw or bypass, but rather
trying to guess passwords by combinations of different characters or using a word list. These
attacks can either be on-line or off-line attack. The first allows that the attacker automates rou-
tines against any open authentication protocol, without looking at the creation of an exploit, but
to abuse of some weaknesses in the networks. The second attempts to emulate the encryption
together with the hash in order to gain access to a system account. We evaluate on-line attacks
because we consider that they can be blocked in time.
To execute a brute-force attack, hydra generates random passwords of variable size
by using of characters that contains 1 for numbers, a for lowcase, and A for upcase characters.
Any other added may be put into the list. In the example above, the passwords generated have a
length of 3 to 4 characters and contain lowercase letters, numbers, a percentage sign and a dot.
Unlike the brute-force, the dictionary attack only needs of two text files: one for usernames and
another for passwords.
The behavior of the attacker was simulated by designing a script that invokes dif-
ferent docker containers at the same time, being executed against a SSH authentication server.
In our simulations, we use an extensive list of words for both usernames and password, that are
obtained from the Internet.
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#!/usr/bin/bash
for (( i=1; i<=10; i++ ))
do
docker exec -d bruteforce$i /usr/bin/hydra -L user.txt -x 3:4:a1%. victim proto
docker exec -d dictionary$i /usr/bin/hydra -L user.txt -P pass.txt victim proto
done
NOTE:
victim: IP Address of the victim server. E.g., SSH, FTP, LDAP.
proto: Authentication protocol of the victim server. E.g., 22,21,389.
user.txt: List of usernames. It contains an extensive list of the more known usernames.
pass.txt: List of passwords. It contains an extensive list of the more known passwords.
To counter these types of threats, we use the proactive and reactive methodologies,
and the intelligence stored in the Knowledge Plane module presented in the Chapter 3. For
example, many password-guessing hosts are proactively dropped in the OpenFlow flow table,
therefore the attacks coming from one of them will be automatically blocked. The malicious
hosts that are not located in the local KP, could be found in the shared KP as long as there is a
match with the indicator of the threat.
The procedure to detect how many authentication tries crossed the network without
being detected by the local Bro IDS is performed by counting the number of Keys Exchange
events that received the server from the attacker. Therefore, we could measure the amount of
authentication tries, and the maximum time that the victim server stops receiving the malicious
events. Figure 15 show how our proposed system reduces the amount of access tries against a
SSH server. The same results could also be obtained using other servers such as FTP, HTTP,
VNC, SMTP as well as any another type of authentication server, included Gmail, Facebook,
or Yahoo accounts that are exposed to these types of password-guessing attacks, because the
access of the users to these social networks use authentication methodologies that also could be
corrupted by brute-force or dictionary attacks.
We also defined the number of concurrent tasks and the maximum wait time in
seconds for responses, because most of IDSs have predefined signatures to detect password
cracking attacks; however, they are based on a defined rates.
Table 11 shows the response times that a victim server and the Bro IDS delay to
drop the next malicious packets sent by the attacker, and the amount of authentication events
that spanned the network and reached the victim server before countermeasures were installed
on the network. These values are obtained by using of both methodologies with intelligence
(+I) or without intelligence (−I), and the comparison of the two values obtained (△I). We can
note that for 1 and 5 malicious hosts, the methodology with intelligence consumes much
less time to drop tries of authentication. However from 10 to more malicious hosts, the time
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Figure 15 – Methodology to counter password guessing-based attacks
consumed by the intelligence is greater than the another methodology, but the processing to
mitigate all the received authentication events is always of the 100% for the intelligence sys-
tem, compared with the another methodology, e.g., for 10 malicious hosts the system without
intelligence only would drop 8 of them, for 20 hosts only drops 16, and for 40 hosts only in 33. It
is because of the anomaly detection algorithm does not work well for big amount of threats act-
ing the same time, while our proposal get dropping all attacks that are found in the KP database.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 compare the response times and the not analyzed authen-
tications evaluated for different amounts of malicious hosts. For example, for 5 hosts, the re-
sponse time to drop authentication tries is of 0.48 seconds and the number of received events
is of 51 both using the intelligence compared to the response time of 10.77 seconds and the
received authentications tries of 55 using the another methodology. Both are totally effectives
to drop threats. However, for number of hosts longer than 10, the response time and the re-
ceived events of both are modified. For example, for 60, maximum number of malicious hosts,
the response time using the intelligence is 82.59 seconds compared to 41.89 seconds of the an-
other methodology, and the number of received authentication tries is of 185 less than 139 of
the methodology without intelligence. Nevertheless, for all cases, using the intelligence we get
dropping all the received malicious events differently of the another methodology that only get
dropping some malicious events. We also conclude that it is better to drop all malicious packets
that to let some of them to pass to the network, because between one of his attempts they could
access to the user account of the victim server.
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#Malicious Hosts M Brute-force & dictionary
Response time(s) Unanalyzed events
Victim Bro Victim Bro
+I 0.15 0.01 16 18
−I 9,80 11,74 19 124
1 malicious host △I 9.65 11.67 3 106
+I 0.48 0.10 51 34
−I 10.77 32.71 55 314
5 malicious host △I 10.29 32.61 4 280
+I 16.09 11.36 99 86
−I 13.75 46.74 108 679
10 malicious host △I 11.19 3 5.38 9 619
+I 59.53 45.49 179 283
−I 35.01 144.58 117 2019
20 malicious host △I 24.52 99.09 62 1736
+I 82.59 82.54 185 311
−I 41.89 230.51 139 3044
40 malicious host △I 40.70 147.97 46 2733
M: Methodology used for each experiment.
+I: With Intelligence. −I: Without intelligence.△I: Difference between +I and −I
Table 11 – Comparison of the response time and received events by the victim server
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Figure 16 – Comparison of the response time varying the amount of malicious hosts
4.3.2 Mitigation of Scanners
TCP port scanners are computer programs that scans network services looking for
connections with open TCP/UDP ports, in order to discover vulnerable services that can be
corrupted by using of exploits and thereby access to the data network. These threats are multi-
threaded, because they scan multiple hosts for a specific listening port, and they also execute
port sweeping to remote networks.
To avoid being detected by firewalls or IDSs, scanners use advanced techniques
such as TCP SYN or TCP ACK, in order to discover hosts running a particular service and also
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Figure 17 – Comparison of the unanalyzed packets varying the amount of malicious hosts
some other features of the target host. These malicious users use half-open TCP connections
to trick the victim server. These methods of scanning are difficult to be detected by security
devices.
As port scanning is often used by attackers, it is important to know how they work
and what possible targets are used to exploit their tools. IntelliFlow leverages the relationships
of organizations to advance threat analysis and security intelligence. For example, (ATLAS. . . ,
2015), a reliable organization that uses a distributed network of sensors to capture and analyze
data, it also provides malicious scanner lists that IntelliFlow may use to store these data into the
knowledge plane.
By using intelligence, we prevent many of these scanners that were previously
identified as threat indicators. Therefore, knowing their existence allows the security admin-
istrators maintain the servers free to be scanned by these malicious users. We simulate the
behavior of these threats by designing a script based in nmap, that executes port sweeping
against one of the test servers. This script performs a slight scanning by setting of the TCP SYN
requests asking for TCP ports of the victim server.
#!/usr/bin/bash
for (( i=1; i<=10; i++ ))
do
docker exec -d scanner$i /usr/bin/nmap -PS -p 1-100 victim
done
NOTE:
victim: IP Address of the victim server. E.g., SSH, FTP, LDAP.
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Figure 18 describe the way how port scanners work by sending client requests to
a range of ports of the victim server. We use TCP SYN to discovery server ports through of
half-open connections. Our results demonstrate that despite the attackers use TCP SYN or TCP
ACK flags, IntelliFlow proactively would block any try of port scanning, before they get any
type of information of the network or server. But if the threat indicator is not found in the local
KP, our system would ask to the shared KP. Each time new threat indicators are registered in the
KP, IntelliFlow immediately executes actions to block the communications between these new
indicators and the destination port of the whole network. However, whether the indicator is not
found in the shared KP, then the Bro reactive methodology is used to counter a possible threat
based on the anomalous behavior of the suspect. The technique to detect anomaly is based on
the number of tries of port scanning performed to an specific server. By default, Bro IDS sends
alarms Scan:Port_Scan when a host has been scanned in 10 unique ports. However, we con-
sider a threshold of 5 port sweeping per malicious host to determine if the port scanner is really
a threat and not a false positive. If it is considered as a threat, automatically a flow is created
on the bridge blocking the source of the attack, and to the same time the indicator is forwarded
to the HoneyPot server. Our results also demonstrate that the response time for dropping port
scanning attacks is nearly 1.81 seconds by using of the intelligence, and longer time for the
methodology without intelligence, because the system waits that the port sweeping attacks are
repeated more than 5 times.
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Figure 18 – Methodology to counter port scanning-based attacks
Chapter 4. Prototype and Experimental Evaluation 65
4.3.3 Mitigation of Botnet Networks
To accomplish the mitigation of these types of threats, we simulate a DDoS attack
launched from a internal botnet network and directed to a victim server. With regard to real
DDoS attacks, we does not consider the problem of the external link’s bandwidth, because our
work only focus attacks performed by our test servers.
Below, we show a script that executes this type of attack by using of hping3 to-
gether with the configuration options such as the SYN flag (−−syn option), the destination port
(−−destport option) and a variable rate of packets per second (−−interval option). We
also note the use of −−verbose to enable verbose output showing more detailed information
about the attack and the parameters −−baseport together with victim for the source port and
the specific target respectively.
#!/usr/bin/bash
for (( i=1; i<=10; i++ ))
do
docker exec -d botnet$i /usr/sbin/hping3 −−verbose −−syn −−destport 80 −−interval
rate −−baseport sport victim
done
NOTE:
rate: Packets sent per second (e.g. u10000 for 100 pps).
sport: Source port used by the botnet network .
victim: IP Address of the victim server. E.g., SSH, FTP, LDAP.
Figure 19 describes how a DDoS attack works, and how our proposal, based on
SDN, get avoiding the SYN malicious packets flooding directed to a victim server. For example,
if we have M bots that form a botnet network and that each one sends 400 SYN packets using
a constant rate of 10 packets per second (pps), then 400*M packets would be sent to the victim
server per attack. However, this server only would receive P packets, that is a lesser amount
compared to the total number of packets initially sent by the attacker, due to some of them
are dropped by IntelliFlow, which executes countermeasures to reconfigure the flow tables by
adding drop rules to the affected bridge. Concerning the Bro IDS, it receives 400*M raw packets
including one packet of TCP retransmission (TCP rtns) for each bot. The TCP retransmissions
occur because there is a lost packet for each new indicator that is mirrored to the IDS. Thus,
the amount of TCP retransmissions is equivalent to the size of the botnet network. On the other
hand, as initial packets are sent with the SYN flag enabled, Bro does not know how to respond
to the victim with ACK flag, hence it only responds by sending RST packets indicating to stop
the TCP connection.
Figure 20 compares the response times against each different rate of packets per
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Figure 19 – Methodology to counter SYN flood-based attacks
second, observing a favorable trend for the intelligence that for higher rates the time to counter
all packets is much less than the methodology without intelligence. We also observe a signifi-
cant difference between the response time for the rates 4000 pps and 6000 pps in the without
intelligence system, thus we deduce that for higher rates, the conventional without intelligence
system does not guarantee an optimal response time, unlike of the intelligence provided by
IntelliFlow proposed system.
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Figure 20 – Comparison of the response time varying the rate of packets per second sent by the
attacker
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In turn, Figure 21 compares unanalyzed packets against the same range of traffic
load, noting that for a rate of 2500 pps, the amount of unanalyzed packets increased slightly
faster in the without intelligence system, being more noticeable for the rate of 6000 pps, in
where these unanalyzed packets for the conventional system is more than twice compared with
our proposed system.
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Figure 21 – Comparison of the not analyzed packets varying the rate of packets per second sent
by the attacker
Regarding the memory and processor usage percentage, Figure 22 and Figure 23
compare the consume of their resources for each variation of the rate of malicious packets. We
also note a similar trend where the intelligence system consume less resources than the other
methodology, nevertheless both they reach their maximum value for rates nearing to 104 packets
per second.
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Figure 22 – Comparison of the memory usage performance varying the rate of packets per sec-
ond sent by the attacker
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Figure 23 – Comparison of the CPU usage performance varying the rate of packets per second
sent by the attacker
Table 12 shows the values of the response time, the amount of not analyzed events,
memory and CPU usage percentages that were obtained in our experiments. These values vary
depending of the size of the botnet network, the amount of packets per second sent by the
attacker, and the methodology used. For example, in the case of a network with 3 bots, each one
would send a succession of SYN requests to a target’s server using a constant rate of 100 pps,
so all the entire network would send the same attack to 300 pps, therefore the methodology with
intelligence would drop the most of the syn flood events leaving only to pass almost a quarter
compared to the other methodology, and in a time near the one-fifth to drop all the packets.
Regarding the memory allocation, the victim server consumed nearly the third part compared
to the used in the another methodology, and with regard to the CPU usage, near the half is
consumed using the intelligence compared the another methodology. We also note that for all
the cases, the amount of packets dropped is more effective using our proposed methodology
than the conventional methodology. We also note in the table that for the worst case of 104pps,
the CPU usage percentage is nearly 100%, so we assume that this rate of packets is the capacity
threshold of each docker container. Therefore, for this worst case, in the proposed methodology
the response time is less that the third part of the memory consumed, and less that half of the
not analyzed packets both being compared with the without intelligence methodology.
4.3.4 Mitigation of malicious Domains and URLs
In this experiment, we work with Malicious Domain Blacklists (MDBLs), in where
reliable organizations, such as Malware Domains, detect and publish malicious domains found
on the Internet. Therefore, any user connected to the Internet, may to know whether its web do-
main is in the blacklist database. However, in order to perform a successful attack, the attackers
would only use a very short period of time to execute their malwares on the infected computer,
so they would avoid being detected and blocked by these domain reputation systems.
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r(pps) M #Bots Response Time(s) Not analyzed events %Memory %CPU
Victim Bro Victim Bro Victim Victim
+I 0.58 0.59 4 4 8.62% 3.17%
5 pps. −I 1 bot 11.61 23.60 54 102 12.50% 4.27%
△I 5 pps. 11.03 23.01 50 98 3.88 1.10
+I 0.87 0.87 10 10 8.65% 3.65%
10 pps. −I 1 bot 12.61 26.32 107 202 13.88% 4.51%
△I 10 pps. 11.74 25.45 97 192 5.23% 0.86
+I 1.63 1.59 165 24 8.72% 4.51
100 pps. −I 1 bot 14.01 32.01 1,071 1,993 17.01% 12.71%
△I 100 pps. 12.38 30.42 906 1,969 8.29% 8.20%
+I 3.50 3.15 1,045 50 9.07% 8.17%
300 pps. −I 3 bots 15.79 44.02 3,806 3,973 25.21% 15.44%
△I 100 pps. 12.29 40.87 2,761 3,923 16.14% 7.27%
+I 6.70 17.64 3,992 145 10.31% 12.42%
600 pps. −I 3 bots 26.59 48.76 15,813 11,717 32.27% 18.24%
△I 200 pps. 19.89 31.12 11,821 11,572 21.96% 5.82%
+I 10.13 27.51 11,986 145 13.41% 13.51%
1,200 pps. −I 3 bots 31.51 58.76 18,222 23,512 44.12% 27.48%
△I 400pps. 21.40 31.25 6,236 23,367 30.71% 13.97%
+I 19.43 14.89 31,805 230 19.24% 14.42%
2,500 pps. −I 5 bots 46.21 63.15 45,942 49,069 53.08% 36.26%
△I 500 pps. 26.78 46.26 14,137 48,839 33.84% 21.84%
+I 29.69 29.16 65,493 339 35.60% 26.67%
4,000 pps. −I 5 bots 52.62 71.41 116,083 78,306 57.37% 39.75%
△I 800 pps. 22.93 42.25 50,590 77,967 21.77% 17.08%
+I 34.37 33.63 200,116 418 58.04% 52.62%
6,000 pps. −I 6 bots 127.69 138.33 223,668 117,185 100% 100%
△I 1,000 pps. 93.32 104.70 23,552 116,767 41.96% 44.38%
+I 48.23 47.45 263,596 427 99.00% 86.92%
10,000
pps. −I 10 bots 157.65 163.13 644,759 124,150 100% 100%
△I 1,000 pps. 109.42 115.68 381,163 123,723 1.00% 13.08%
r(pps): Total of rate of packets per second.
M: Methodology used for each experiment.
+I: With Intelligence. −I: Without intelligence.△I: The difference between +I and −I.
Table 12 – Comparison of the response time, received events, memory, and CPU usage percent-
age
To avoid that these malicious domains infect computers, we propose the same two
methodologies discussed above: reactive and proactive with intelligence. By using the proac-
tive methodology, we avoid any access to these websites, due to OpenFlow rules would im-
mediately being created to block any remote access from the users. Unlike the proactive, the
reactive methodology with intelligence would consist in reactively dropping any access to these
domains.
Figure 24 shows an example of how the malicious websites work. By the moment
an user accesses to a malicious website, the local Bro IDS looks for the domain indicator in the
KP. If this is found, Bro immediately sends a security alarm to the network indicating that one
threat has been found. Then, one countermeasure is executed disconnecting the access from the
user to the website in a very short time.
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On the other hand, we simulate the behavior of these websites by setting up ma-
licious web servers and URLs. We use “example.com” as main domain name and generate
different sub domains having as base to example.com. All these are located at the knowledge
plane of our system.
Each server contains a certain malicious code that may exploit vulnerabilities against
victims at the time that they access to one of these malicious websites. However, according to
our experiments, the time to block the access to these websites is nearly 0.07 seconds. Thus,
our system would intelligently block these websites before or at the beginning of the attack,
avoiding the victim getting infected with malwares.
These methods are effective because we consider that people do not usually immedi-
ately stop browsing on websites and are often attracted by misleading advertisements containing
malicious code. As most websites have to complete multiple actions in order to activate their
malwares, our proposed methodology is valid for any attempt of access to malicious websites.
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Figure 24 – Methodology to counter malicious website-based attacks
4.3.5 Considerations on the cost of proactive approaches
A final noteworthy consideration on all the experiments shall be made with regard to
the costs of a proactive approach in terms of OpenFlow state. In case of software-based imple-
mentations of OpenFlow switches (e.g., OVS), while the size of the flow table is not a limitation,
the amount of OpenFlow rules cause a linear increase in the memory consumption of the switch
instance and may also add delay to flow table operations such as rule updates, packet look-
ups, statistic gathering, and so on. Some user experiences have pointed to certain unexpected
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behavior in OpenFlow switches when adding a large amount of flow entries. 7 In case that a
hardware-based OpenFlow switch solution is considered, without further considerations on the
flow table sizes, a simple proactive approach may be infeasible since hardware switches have
strict limitations on the flow table sizes – typically in the range of 10s of thousands of entries in
today’s commercial equipments (KREUTZ et al., 2015). Therefore, future work may consider
state optimization strategies to add only the more relevant flows indicating malicious activities
to the data plane while keeping the remaining flows stored in the SDN controller and/or local
or shared KP.
7 Discuss mailing list OpenVSwitch. Topic: Able to add more than maximum number of flow entries in Flow
table. Source: “http://openvswitch.org/pipermail/discuss/2012-May/007276.html”
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5 Conclusions
Malicious users keep innovating their attack techniques much faster than defend-
ers are finding ways to avoid them. Conventional defense and mitigation approaches such as
anomaly-based or signature-based detection methods are not enough to counter the increasing
amount and diversity of security threats. Security devices such as firewalls and IDS/IPS com-
monly rely on pre-defined rules added by humans. Many times security teams only focus on the
event itself and do not perform a proper deep analysis on the root security problem.
In order to understand how adversaries work, organizations are resorting to new
security approaches based on jointly processed information, actionable by security experts of
organizations, forming the so-called Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). This classified informa-
tion is known as intelligence, and it allows other organizations to updated their security
devices with up-to-date configuration based on the intelligence data.
In this thesis, we have proposed IntelliFlow as a security architecture that leverages
CTI in the context of Software-Defined Networking (SDN). More specifically, we use three
CTI threat indicators: IP address, Domain, and URL, available in the Collective Intelligence
Framework (CIF). CIF uses the IODEF format to exchange events or incident information, and
the GPB protocol to make queries against different reputation’s databases. Thus, CIF improves
the communication between the security team and the reliable organizations. After process-
ing the intelligence data and importing feeds from different reliable sources, we populate the
knowledge plane proposed in the IntelliFlow system.
Taking advantage of CTI feeds, the Bro IDS intelligence framework was used to
read the data processed by the CIF and to intelligently alert the network about possible threats.
Then, the OpenFlow protocol was used to reconfigure the flow tables of the affected switches
either reactively or proactively. When using the proactive methodology, our knowledge plane
(KP) was updated every five minutes with the data shared by reliable organizations participat-
ing in CIF. The data was immediately transformed into suitable OpenFlow rules to drop all
traffic matching the malicious indicators. In the reactive mode of operation using the intelli-
gence feeds, the system is able to react to different types of threats.
Our experiments demonstrated that, for brute-force or dictionary attacks, we can
mitigate long authentication attempts using the intelligence provided by CTI, unlike conven-
tional methodologies that would only manage to drop part of them. In the case of distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks, our system manages to drop packets in less time, receiving a
smaller amount of packets, using less memory and CPU. Therefore, the IntelliFlow architecture
allows better ways to intelligently prevent or react against some type of known threats when
present in our KP or in the KPs shared by different organizations participating in the threat
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intelligence layer.
One of the limitations of our proposal is updating all available intelligence period-
ically. Another limitation is having explored only the three most known indicators provided by
trusted organizations. Other indicators could also be used –provided proper methods to convert
indicators to OpenFlow rules is available.
As future work, we intend to explore with more detail the correlation between the
information obtained from reliable sources and from IDS sensors strategically located in differ-
ent public networks, in order to collect real data of attacks received in real time. By looking into
OpenFlow statistics we may be able to identify zero-day attacks and detect different threats.
Then, by leveraging machine learning techniques, we could provide capabilities to analyze the
behavior patterns from attackers.
Future efforts shall also be devoted to a better understanding of the costs in terms
of required state and its implications in software- and hardware-based OpenFlow switches. In
turn, state optimization opportunities shall be pursued. Another avenue of future work would
be generating automatic countermeasures to protect the data against newly attacks that are not
found in the intelligence database of the reliable sources. When applied to inter-domain scenar-
ios with real attacks from the Internet, developing new attack models based on machine learning
techniques would allow further levels of collaborative approaches towards a more secure Inter-
net.
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